I share your pain with the security people. One project I worked on involved a solution to reduce the amount of hardware on desks in an operation where the users had to access two physically separated networks. So we said the obvious - use a single monitor, keyboard and mouse between the two systems using a KVM switch. Enter the security man who insisted on a thorough security evaluation of the KVM switch. But it's just a switch, we said. Oh nonononono, it's an electronic device! What if the data displayed on the screen of one system somehow found it's way through the switch, backwards down the screen cable of the other system and thus onto the other network? (I'm not embellishing, that is exactly what they said) What if the device could be compromised by an attacker to make it do this? What if this, and what if that? (And what if we thump you, which we were tempted with I can tell you).
Eventually they saw sense, but only after insisting that we use a totally passive switch box (i.e. literally a switch in a box), which caused endless support calls because when you switched it over there was a momentary break between systems and the mouse and/or keyboard used to stop working.
It worries me that our governments have such technically inept people making sure I can sleep safely in my bed at night. Murderers, terrorists and flesh-eating aliens might overrun us, but at least the hideous threat of the active KVM switch will be robustly defeated
